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Abstract—Electric energy systems are undergoing significant
changes to improve system reliability and accommodate in-
creasing power demands. The penetration of distributed en-
ergy resources (DERs) including roof-top solar panels, energy
storage, electric vehicles, etc., enables the on-site generation of
economically dispatchable power curtailing operational costs.
The effective control of DERs requires communication between
utilities and DER system operators. The communication protocols
employed for DER management and control lack sophisticated
cybersecurity features and can compromise power systems secure
operation if malicious control commands are issued to DERs.
To overcome authentication-related protocol issues, we present a
bolt-on security extension that can be implemented on Distributed
Network Protocol v3 (DNP3). We port an authentication frame-
work, DERauth, into DNP3, and utilize real-time measurements
from a simulated DER battery energy storage system to enhance
communication security. We evaluate our framework in a testbed
setup using DNP3 master and outstation devices performing
secure authentication by leveraging the entropy of DERs.
Index Terms—Authentication, distributed energy resources,
DNP3, hardware security, power grid.
I. INTRODUCTION
As the electric power grid advances towards a decentralized
architecture, distributed energy resources (DERs) are becom-
ing more prevalent all over the globe. DER generation capacity
is expected to proliferate from 132.4 GW in 2017 to 528.4
GWs by 2026 due to their contribution in more efficient grid
operation, economical power, low carbon emissions, and more
reliable power systems [1], [2]. DERs are small-scale power
generation or storage assets, often in the range of 1 kW to
10 MW, placed on the distribution level close to consumers
and loads. Examples of DERs include PV systems, electric
vehicles, wind turbines, etc. often bolstered by energy storage
solutions such as battery energy storage systems (BESS), fuel
cells, and flywheels. BESS-based DERs incorporate mostly
lithium-ion (li-ion) battery cells as their energy storage ele-
ments due to their long life-cycles, high energy density, and
low maintenance costs [3].
To harness the power of DERs for grid services, intercon-
nection and interoperability standards, such as IEEE 1547-
2020, enforces DERs to include communication interfaces
enabling local and bulk power system management and con-
trol [4]. DER-to-utility or DER-to-aggregator communica-
tion is supported by embedded devices and network proto-
cols [5]. Prominent communication protocols include IEEE
1815-Distributed Network Protocol v3 (DNP3), Modbus, and
IEEE 2030.5 [6]. Their non-proprietary nature aids manu-
facturers in developing custom implementations which lack
robust security features or require computationally intensive
processes to meet security requirements [7], [8].
Although IEEE 1547-2020 Std. mandates secure communi-
cations for DER monitoring and control, there is a plethora of
already deployed legacy devices utilizing insecure or outdated
communication protocol versions. For example, more than
75% of North American utilities employ DNP3 for super-
visory control and data acquisition [7]. DNP3 vulnerabilities
undermine not only the security of the communication channel
but also the security of devices relying on this protocol.
In [9] a comprehensive presentation of DNP3 vulnerabilities
is presented. Recently, DNP3 received updates to conform
with IEEE 1547-2020 and feature cryptographically secure
properties similar to newer protocols (e.g., IEEE 2030.5) [10],
however, the protocol has still significant drawbacks and
legacy devices still remain a valid concern [11], [12].
As with most cybersecurity problems, there is no single sil-
ver bullet which can single-handedly fend off all attacks [13].
We provide a security extension that can enhance utility-
to-DER communications while requiring minimum redesign
efforts. In this work, we leverage the inherent cell entropy from
BESS-enabled DER devices, demonstrated in DERauth [14],
to develop a hardware-based security primitive which can
be incorporated in DNP3 communications and support se-
cure authentication. We port DERauth functionality to the
OpenDNP3 library, an open source reference implementation
for the DNP3 protocol [15]. DERauth’s security mechanism
leverages a challenge-reply scheme, which incorporates real-
time BESS measurements, to generate unique cell signatures
(secure authentication). Experimental results implemented on
the OpenDNP3 stack validate our scheme using battery data
generated by simulated li-ion cells. Specifically, our contri-
butions can be summarized as follows: (i) we expand our
previous work and port DERauth’s BESS-based authentication
scheme into the OpenDNP3 protocol stack, (ii) we utilize
simulated li-ion battery measurements factoring their real-
world discrepancies for the secure authentication process, and
(iii) we provide the implementation details of the design
which can be ported in any DNP3-assisted industrial control
environment reinforcing communications security.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II de-
scribes our methodology. Section III presents the experimental
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Fig. 1. DERauth secure authentication framework.
setup and results of our implementation. Section IV concludes
the paper and discusses future work.
II. DERAUTH FRAMEWORK
The DERauth framework secures the measurement and
control command data issued to DERs. It provides a security
extension that can be retrofitted to any BESS-enabled grid
asset which uses DNP3 with minimum redesign requirements,
serving as an authentication layer on top of the DNP3 protocol
stack. A high-level overview of the DERauth framework is
presented in Fig. 1. It operates using a 64-bit challenge-reply
scheme between DNP3 master and DNP3 outstation devices
(located on the DER side). It requires DER outstation devices
to be authenticated before control commands can be issued
from the DNP3 master. The authentication process leverages
the intrinsic characteristics of the BESS li-ion battery cells to
generate entropy. The concept leverages the BESS cell voltage
and state-of-charge (SoC) measurements, and incorporates the
inherent randomness – caused by the unique li-ion physical
properties due to their manufacturing process – for the protocol
replies. Below, we outline the core components of DERauth;
more details about the implementation are provided in [14].
A. System Components
The communication between a DNP3 master and DER
outstation devices is initiated after the enrollment and authen-
tication phases.
Enrollment phase: In this phase, the DNP3 master and DER
outstation device start their communication and exchange their
cell-reply tables, Crt. The Crt table includes 8-bit sequences
(ri) for each BESS cell which are returned if the specific cell
gets authenticated. Crt is defined as Crt = N× < ci, ri >,
where N is the number of BESS cells, and ci and ri represent
the i-th BESS cell and its predefined reply, respectively.
Notably, the contents of the Crt table get updated at every
authentication round and at both communication ends asyn-
chronously. Thus, in the event of a compromise, the attained
information does not provide useful details to man-in-the-
middle adversaries.
Authentication phase: This phase comprises the main por-
tion of DERauth and can be segmented into three parts.
1 First, the DNP3 master constructs the 64-bit challenge.
The first 16 bits of the 64-bit challenge define which BESS
cells will be polled for their real-time voltages and SoCs.
The next 32 bits, indicate which BESS cells need to be
authenticated (their corresponding ris from the Crt table will
Fig. 2. Top-level diagram of test setup for evaluating the DERauth process
using the DNP3 communication protocol.
be returned if the authentication succeeds). The remaining
16 bits instruct the DNP3 outstation device, monitoring and
controlling the operation of the DER asset, regarding the
type of transformation that will take place before the reply
is forwarded to the DNP3 master device.
2 The next part of the authentication process occurs on
the DNP3 outstation device. Upon receiving the 64-bit chal-
lenge, the outstation first translates the challenge and builds
a corresponding 64-bit reply following the format specified
by the DNP3 master. The DNP3 reply includes the real-time
voltage and SoC BESS cell measurements, and the ris from
the requested cells. After this temporary reply is built, it gets
transformed using a predefined transformation function, and
the last 16 bits of the issued challenge. This transformation
increases the reply entropy and once the temporary reply is
transformed, it is forwarded to the DNP3 master for validation.
The real-time voltage and SoC measurements, in addition to
the constantly updating ris and the transformation function,
effectively increase the challenge-reply entropy and the secu-
rity of our protocol, rendering reconstructing or decoding the
exchanged data infeasible.
3 Upon receiving the 64-bit reply, the DNP3 master
calculates locally the expected reply according to the challenge
format and then compares it with the received one. If the
local version of the reply – calculated by the DNP3 master
– coincides with the received one from the DNP3 outstation,
then the authentication round is performed successfully. In any
other case, the round has failed, and hence, any exchanged in-
formation is dropped and the authentication phase is repeated.
Only if the authentication succeeds, then both the DNP3 mas-
ter and outstation can update their Crt table copies using the
exchanged real-time voltage and SoC information. Following
this procedure, static information is not retained anywhere
in our system (both Crt tables are updated asynchronously),
impeding attackers from gaining sufficient system information
and reverse-engineering our security protocol extension.
III. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP & RESULTS
A. Setup & Design Parameters
For the evaluation of the DERauth authentication process,
we implement a testbed setup where two computing stations
TABLE I
LI-ION CELLS PARAMETERS AND CHARACTERISTICS.
Parameters Cell #1 Cell #2
Nominal Voltage (V) 3.5 3.5
Rated Capacity (Ah) 2 2
Initial SoC (%) 64 65
Response Time (s) 5 5
Max. Capacity (Ah) 2.05 2.02
Cut-off Voltage 2.625 2.622
Fully Charged Voltage (V) 4.1 4.1
Nominal Discharge Current (A) 0.4 0.4
Internal Resistance (Ohms) 0.017 0.012
Capacity at Nominal Voltage (Ah) 1.8087 1.7897
Exponential Zone [V, Ah] [3.88, 0.2] [3.81, 0.2]
Fig. 3. Li-ion cell #1 discharge characteristics. C is a measure of the rate
at which the battery cell is discharged relative to its max. capacity. R is the
internal resistance of the battery cell. The parameters E0, K, A, and B are
parameters that model the behavior of the battery cell. E0 is the constant
voltage in V, K is the polarization constant in V/Ah, A is the exponential
voltage in V, and B is the exponential capacity in Ah−1.
communicate via DNP3, as master and outstation. Fig. 2
depicts the overall top-level diagram of the test setup. The
master and outstation devices are running modified versions
of DNP3, using the open-source OpenDNP3 library [15],
which integrates the DERauth challenge-reply mechanism and
supports an SQLite database to store the temporary challenge-
reply values exchanged during authentication. In this imple-
mentation, the DNP3 outstation is modeled as an agent that
interacts with the BESS, i.e., the DER, and the master DNP3
device is modeled as an agent that sends the corresponding
charge/discharge setpoints to the outstation DER.
B. DER Li-ion Battery Modeling
The li-ion cells of the BESS interacting with the DNP3
outstation agent are modeled using the MATLAB/Simscape
battery model [16]. This model provides predetermined behav-
iors for different types of battery chemistries such as nickel-
cadmium, lead-acid, and li-ion batteries. It also supports the
simulation of temperature and aging effects in the battery
cells.In order to obtain realistic values from the battery cell
simulations, the cell temperature is also considered, since it
can affect the voltage during charge and discharge operations.
Fig. 4. Li-ion cell #2 discharge characteristics. C is a measure of the rate
at which the battery cell is discharged relative to its max. capacity. R is the
internal resistance of the battery cell. The parameters E0, K, A, and B are
parameters that model the behavior of the battery cell. E0 is the constant
voltage in V, K is the polarization constant in V/Ah, A is the exponential
voltage in V, and B is the exponential capacity in Ah−1.
Six li-ion cells are modeled and two of those cells are used
for the DERauth authentication. Figs. 3 and 4 depict the cell
and discharge characteristics of the two battery cells selected
to provide their respective voltages and SoC values. A battery
management system is devised to provide the voltage and
SoC measurements from individual cells in the battery system.
Table I shows the parameters and characteristics that define the
behavior of the battery cell models.
C. Case Study & Results
To assess the operation of DERauth within the test setup
presented in Section III-A, a modified version of OpenDNP3
integrating DERauth is deployed in two different computers
connected via an Ethernet switch. The DNP3 communication
protocol runs over TCP/IP and the master and outstation
are configured to interchange 64-bit float Analog values, i.e.,
Group 32, Variation 8 [10].
In this case study, the master device initiates the DERauth
authentication process every time it sends a new setpoint com-
mand to the outstation controlling the DER. Specifically, in our
scenario, the DERauth authentication challenge is predefined
to occur 5 seconds before the master sends the corresponding
operation command to the respective outstation. Although a 5-
second interval is selected for this case study, any other value
could also be used depending on the operational requirements.
Figs. 6 and 7 present the voltage and SoC measurements from
the two cells used in DERauth. The total simulation time
is 5000 seconds, and four battery operations are requested
by the master controller. These operations are: (i) a 10 W
discharge request at 500 seconds, (ii) a no-operation (no-op)
request at 2000 seconds, (iii) a 10 W charge request at 3000
seconds, and (iv) a no-operation (no-op) request at 4500
seconds. At each of these points, DERauth is executed before
(5 seconds) the setpoint command is issued. The specific
values exchanged by the master and outstation devices during
these four authentications are presented in Fig. 5. Notably, the
Fig. 5. 64-bit challenge and replies exchanged between the DNP3 master and outstation during the DERauth authentication process.
Fig. 6. Voltage measurements for li-ion cells during test scenario operations.
The red boxes mark the time when DERauth is performed 5 seconds before
an operation is carried out.
Fig. 7. State-of-charge (SoC) measurements for li-ion cells during test
scenario operations. The red boxes mark the time when DERauth is performed
5 seconds before an operation is carried out.
voltage and SoC values polled, are used to construct the reply
for each corresponding challenge.
IV. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper demonstrates the implementation of a hardware-
based authentication framework for DERs. We port DERauth,
which leverages existing hardware and li-ion manufacturing
variations, into OpenDNP3 enabling BESS-based DER system
secure authentication. The implementation is evaluated in a
testbed setup comprised of a DNP3 master and outstation
device with a simulated li-ion BESS. Future work will focus
on assessing the DERauth secure authentication extension in
a full-fledged distribution system with multiple DERs.
Master devices upon verifying the authenticity of DER
assets will be able to issue control commands to the respective
outstation devices. Real-time simulation environments will be
used to evaluate the practicality of the DERauth authentication
process against other protocols implementations in realistic
scenarios and under stringent operational constraints (e.g., traf-
fic, latency) [17]. Finally, the necessary application program
interface to integrate our hardware-based security scheme in
other existing protocols, such as Modbus and IEEE 2030.5,
will be designed.
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